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Introduction: The World Economy and National Policies 
T
raditionally, international economic policy has been limited to two themes. The first is
microeconomic issues “at the border,” including tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and
customs procedures. The second theme focuses on macroeconomic links to the interna-
tional economy through variables such as the exchange rate and the balance of payments.
More recently, however, several new themes have emerged, from labour and environmen-
tal standards, to competition and foreign investment policy, to product standards and other
Vol um e   1   N um be r  1 , 2 00 0/   p. 1 1 - 2 1 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o m
National Policies and 
the Limits of International Integration
James Gerber
Economics Department, San Diego State University
In spite of the rapid growth of merchandise trade since the end of World War II, the world
economy is far from integrated. Services trade, capital flows, population migration, and
price differences demonstrate far more scope for international economic integration. Even
among nations with preferential trade agreements, networks of merchandise trade relations
are far denser intra-nationally than internationally. The absence of goods trade predicted by
trade models when nations have few policy barriers implies that crossing national bound-
aries is a significant indicator of increased transaction costs. These patterns have caused the
world trade agenda to examine some unintended trade restrictions which make up a part of
national domestic policies. This focus is apparent in current negotiations such as the Free
Trade of the Americas Agreement. New items for negotiation include product standards,
competition policies, services, and investment policies. Most contentious are labor and envi-
ronmental standards, where the potential for protectionist capture is greater and the mutual
recognition versus harmonization debate is obscured.
Keywords: deeper integration; free trade; Heckscher-Ohlin model; integration; trade barri-
ers; WTOfields traditionally reserved for national or sub-national policy.
A variety of forces have pushed international economic policy across the line that has
traditionally separated international and domestic issues. None of these forces is greater
than the growth of world trade during the second half of the 20th century. Between 1963
and 1996, world output growth averaged about 3 percent per year, while world trade grew
more than 10 percent per year, expanding from US $30.5 thousand million to US $826.6
thousand million (World Trade Organization, vol. II, 1997).  The leading reasons cited for
this growth in trade include falling transportation costs, rising incomes, and declining tar-
iff and non-tariff barriers; there is less agreement over the role of preferential trade agree-
ments between subsets of the world’s nations (Rose, 1991; Krugman, 1995; Frankel, 1997).
Trade growth, however, is but one of the many forces pushing nations to negotiate their
domestic policies. Private international capital flows, advances in telecommunications and
other technological changes, and global climate change, to name a few, are all working in
the same direction. 
Elements of International Integration
I
n spite of the growth of trade, empirical analysis of international economic integration
shows that the world is a long way from a single global market (Frankel, 1997;
Helliwell, 1998). For example, the United States and Canada share the largest single bilat-
eral trade relationship in the world. Helliwell (1998) and McCallum (1995) have shown
that Canadian provinces are 10 to 12 times more likely to trade with other provinces than
with the United States, even after adjusting for differences in market size and distance. In
general, most measurements of integration have focused on merchandise goods or capital
flows, where there is a relative abundance of data. Flows of goods and capital are not the
only spheres where integration occurs, however; indicators of integration should also con-
sider trade in services, population movements, and the international linkages of prices. 
Services 
Trade in services is far more restricted than trade in goods, yet the share of services in the
economies of industrial nations is 70 percent of GDP or more, and although the share of
services is usually smaller in industrializing nations, it is still often over 50 percent. The
value of services exported by the United States was 37 percent of the value of goods
exported in 1997, while in developing countries the value of services exported can often
reach 20 percent of the value of goods exported (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1998;
International Monetary Fund, 1998). 
Multilateral commitments to trade liberalization under the WTO have only recently
begun to include services. The Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986-1993) led to the adop-
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Services, GATS) and began a slow movement towards increased liberalization. In addition
to addressing services trade, the Uruguay Round extended the scope of negotiations to
include investment measures and intellectual property rights, both of which have important
impacts on service products. Since then, WTO-sponsored plurilateral agreements have
been signed in two important service industries, telecommunications and financial ser-
vices.
Most of the bilateral and plurilateral agreements in the Western Hemisphere and else-
where omit large parts of the service economy. For example, all of Chile’s bilateral trade
agreements omit services. The Southern Cone’s common market (MERCOSUR), compris-
ing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, proposes to include the free circulation of
services, but there are many exceptions, particularly in the area of investments that limit
the provision of services by foreign firms. The Andean Community also intends to permit
the free circulation of services, without exception, but few details have been specified
(Organization of American States, 1999a).
Capital Flows 
The increased variety of international financial instruments and the reduction of transac-
tion costs brought on by advances in telecommunications have drastically increased the
dollar value of international capital flows. While volatile speculative flows have become
the bane of many economies, more permanent flows of foreign direct investment (FDI)
have also risen significantly, from around 0.4 percent of global GDP in 1985 to over 1 per-
cent in 1997 (Preeg, 1998). 
Globally, integrated financial markets imply that the correlation between national sav-
ings and national investment should be small, since savers would not have preferences for
their national markets but would invest wherever they earn the highest returns. Feldstein
and Horioka (1980), however, show that domestic savings and investment levels are high-
ly correlated, although the correlation has been falling in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury, presumably as capital markets have become more integrated. Nevertheless, Taylor
(1996) shows that increased capital market integration since approximately 1950 is a
recovery of some, but not all, of the integration lost between 1929 and 1950. 
P r i c e s
In a highly integrated international economy, purchasing power parity (PPP) would hold.
PPP is the simple idea that national price levels should be equal once they are converted to
a common currency. Rogoff (1996) argues that the literature on PPP has achieved a “sur-
prising degree of consensus” around the following two points. First, PPP does seem to hold
in the long run, but price convergence is extremely slow, perhaps in the order of 15 percent
13
James Gerber
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eper year. Second, in the short run, deviations from PPP are “large and volatile.” In sum, it
is impossible to find credible evidence in the price data for the existence of a unified inter-
national goods market.   
Two Puzzles about International Economic Integration
E
conomic integration is desirable because it increases allocative efficiency, it produces
dynamic spillover benefits that enhance growth, and it lowers prices and thereby
improves consumer welfare. In addition, open markets reduce the hold of domestic monop-
olists and improve competition, while international capital flows partially compensate for
the scarcity of domestic capital and are a primary source of technology transfer. Empirical
studies using global data sets tend to confirm that economic growth is faster in more open
economies (Edwards, 1993; OECD, 1998).
It is curious, then, that in the cases where free trade has existed long enough for struc-
tural adjustments to occur, for example, the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA) or the
European Union, the network of economic relationships remains far denser within nations
than between nations. Among OECD countries, the effects of national borders make the
average level of intra-national trade about ten times greater than international trade, after
controlling for distance, the size of national markets, and language differences. CUSTA
increased the density of international trade relative to the networks of intra-national trade,
but after several years of increasing relative importance, international networks no longer
seem to be deepening relative to intra-national ones.  With respect to forms of integration
other than merchandise trade, empirical analysis shows that firms remain biased towards
transacting within the nation. Border effects on services and migration are even greater
than those affecting merchandise trade, while the international integration of prices and
capital flows appears to be broadly consistent with the results for trade (Helliwell, 1998).
In other words, economic policy permits a far greater degree of integration than actually
occurs.
Furthermore, there is a lot of  “missing” trade, relative to the predictions of the stan-
dard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of endowments-based-trade theory (Trefler, 1995).
Some of the failure of theory to accurately predict trade volumes may stem from the unre-
alistic assumptions of the HO model, yet it is also the case that the HO model seems to fair-
ly accurately predict intra-national trade patterns (Davis et al., 1997). 
One implication of these two points—(1) far denser intra-national networks than can
be explained by policy barriers to international trade, by distance, or by market size, and
(2) the absence of trade that is predicted by theory, given international differences in
endowments—is that the nation state and national boundaries reduce transaction costs for
firms operating within their borders. This hypothesis implies that either we have reached
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awaits the reduction of barriers that are less transparent than tariffs and quantitative restric-
tions. Given the economic and political pressures on governments to negotiate a wide array
of new issues, a case can be made for the second interpretation. 
Recurrent Themes in the Global Trade A g e n d a
T
he fact that national borders are still important probably ranks as one of the least sur-
prising findings of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons why it is
worth stressing. First, it is a useful counterbalance to the unrealistic hopes and fears that
have been generated by popular perceptions of a new, global economy. Second, it raises
important questions about the future direction of the world trade agenda. 
The direction of trade liberalization as embodied in, say, the WTO or the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) contains a number of themes that go far beyond the
traditional topics of tariffs and quotas, and beyond the traditional sector of manufactured
goods. For example, between the Miami Summit in December of 1994 and the Santiago
Summit in April of 1998, FTAA negotiators created 12 working groups to prepare the
agenda. The topics included market access, customs procedures, rules of origin, standards
and technical barriers, intellectual property rights, subsidies and antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, services trade, investment measures,
government procurement, competition policy, dispute settlement, and the role of small
economies. Since the Santiago Summit, some issues have been combined, but by any mea-
sure, the negotiating agenda comprises much more than tariffs and quantitative restrictions
(Hufbauer and Schott, 1999).
Robert Z. Lawrence (1995) differentiates new issues from traditional issues of tariffs
and quantitative restrictions by distinguishing between trade barriers that are at the border
and barriers (often unintended) that result from a nation’s non-trade, domestic policies.
Lawrence labelled integration caused by the removal of tariffs and other border barriers as
shallow integration; he labelled integration caused by the removal of domestic policy bar-
riers as deep integration. Deep integration was not entirely new to the 1990s, since the
Tokyo Round (1973-1979) of the GATT negotiations covered domestic subsidies; howev-
er the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and the 1990s wave of preferential trade agreements
have made a number of new issues negotiable. Important elements of this agenda include
foreign investment and competition policies, along with the related issues of antidumping
and countervailing duties, and labour, environmental, and product standards, including
sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. 
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Investment is a necessary complement to trade, particularly in the cases of service indus-
tries, which must provide their products at the source of consumption, and a variety of
high-tech goods industries that require consumer education, special credit arrangements,
and after-sales service. The number of bilateral and plurilateral investment agreements has
increased significantly in the 1990s, particularly in the Western Hemisphere (Organization
of American States, 1999b). These investment arrangements are often part of broad-based
trade agreements such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR, but also are stand-alone bilateral
investment treaties. For example, Chile’s trade agreements with Canada, Colombia,
Ecuador, MERCOSUR, Mexico, and Venezuela contain investment provisions, and Chile
has also signed separate bilateral investment treaties with Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua, among others. 
Developing countries are interested in ensuring that they receive private capital flows,
while high-income economies seek to take advantage of new systems of global production.
In general, investment agreements seek to provide foreign investors with national treat-
ment, to create an investment form of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, to remove per-
formance requirements, and to eliminate restrictions on capital and profit remittances.
From the standpoint of host countries, the goals are to raise national investment levels,
increase the rate of technology transfer, and increase economic growth. 
Competition Policies 
Large-scale commercial enterprises with significant market (and political) power emerged
during the latter part of the 19th century. In response, many nations developed competition
(antitrust) policies aimed at preserving their economies of scale while ensuring that con-
sumers reaped some of the benefits. Competition policies generally limit horizontal
restraints such as price-fixing agreements or the formation of domestic cartels. There is less
consensus over prohibitions of territorial divisions and over vertical constraints such as
exclusive agreements between producers and distributors. Most nations permit export car-
tels and offer a wide variety of individual exceptions to their own rules. 
The overlap between competition policy and trade policy occurs because the benefits
created by the removal of tariffs can be offset by the absence of domestic competition.
Price fixing, output restriction, allocation of market shares, or exclusive dealing, all may
mean that technically open markets are effectively closed to foreign firms.
International variation in competition policies partly stems from differences in nation-
al views towards competition (Scherer, 1995). As a result, there are significant variations
in remedies for addressing the breakdown in competition, the willingness to grant excep-
tions to national rules, the perceived costs of allowing uncompetitive practices, and the
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Western Hemisphere, NAFTA, the Canada-Chile FTA, and the G-3 (Colombia, Mexico,
and Venezuela) have committees to review competition policy developments affecting the
agreements, and the G-3 countries have begun to harmonize practices. Both the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR have competition policy provisions. Twelve countries in the
Western Hemisphere have legal provisions designed to protect competition, but there are a
wide number of exceptions to these rules, particularly in the areas of territorial restraints,
exclusive agreements between manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, and agreements
to share research, technology, production, and marketing (Organization of American
States, 1999c). In addition, state monopolies are usually exempted, as are a variety of spe-
cific sectors, and many countries have no rules regarding mergers.
A second intersection between competition policy and trade policy takes place in the
area of antidumping duties (ADD). In theory, it is possible to eliminate antidumping duties
if there are international agreements on competition policies; in practice, the Canada-Chile
FTAhas already done this. The elimination of antidumping duties is desirable for a variety
of reasons. First, ADDs assume that exporters have market power at home that enables
them to finance below cost sales abroad, but the imposed remedy is to raise foreign prices
rather than lower home prices. Second, in the short run, competitive firms will sell below
average costs, yet ADDs use an average cost criterion to judge whether dumping has
occurred. Third, ADDs have increased the extraterritorial application of national competi-
tion policies.
Agreements on competition policies are likely to have costs as well as benefits. One of
the costs would be added constraints on national industrial development policies. Many
nations allow various forms of horizontal and vertical collusion as an element of these poli-
cies, particularly in cases where imperfect capital markets or high information costs lead
to less than a socially optimal level of investment. For example, investment in a particular
export industry may require simultaneous investments in port facilities in order to be prof-
itable. Various forms of firm collusion, including information sharing and exclusive con-
tracts, may help to overcome the market failure but may also run afoul of competition pol-
icy. Similarly, other forms of market failure, such as under-investment in new technologies
or in technology transfer, are frequently addressed with exceptions to competition policy
that permit a certain degree of collusion between firms.
Labour and Environmental Standards 
Labour and environmental standards are part of the trade agenda because developed coun-
tries demand it. These demands will persist in spite of the fact that it is unlikely that labour
or environmental agreements will have the same effect of increasing trade flows that
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these demands as a new form of protectionism, a view supported by the fact that the
sources of many of the initiatives for labour and environmental standards are groups inter-
ested in reducing trade flows. Nevertheless, the full range of motives behind the call for
standards is diverse and includes humanitarian and ecological concerns, as well as the fear
of competitive advantage which is conferred by exploitation of the environment or labour,
and the fear that trade with less developed countries has increased wage inequality (United
States) or the rate of unemployment (Europe).
Space limitations prevent a full discussion of these issues, but a couple of observations
are warranted. First, with respect to environmental issues, economic analysis is absolutely
clear that trade interventions are rarely an optimal approach to pollution reduction and that
full cost pricing (i.e., internalization of the environmental costs of production within the
firm) is far superior to any form of trade intervention (Corden, 1997). Second, trade sanc-
tions by themselves have a miserable track record at achieving their goals, so even if they
were not sub-optimal policy, they are relatively ineffective (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot,
1990). Third, with respect to the argument that trade has caused income inequality and
unemployment, there is a developing consensus that technological change is far more pow-
erful at generating inequality and that macroeconomic and labour market policies (not
trade policies) are the reasons behind the high rates of unemployment in some industrial
countries over the last 20 years (Cline, 1999). Fourth, much of the rhetoric in industrial
countries has conflated the issue of low wages and low productivity as legitimate sources
of comparative advantage with lax enforcement or exploitation as a source of advantage. 
In spite of the last point, the moral outrage of many middle-class residents of industri-
al nations over the low wages and poor working conditions prevalent in developing coun-
tries makes it unlikely that the proposal to link trade sanctions to enforcement of labour
standards will disappear soon. Apartial sense of legitimacy for this linkage is conferred by
the fact that all nations impose a variety of restrictions on new technologies and new prod-
ucts when they offend moral or ethical standards. One has only to think of the bans on slav-
ery or experimentation on humans. Similarly, animal experimentation is widely regulated,
as are technologies and products associated with birth control and human sexuality. The
point is that these are considered legitimate restrictions on trade, technology, and produc-
tion, because they offend the citizens (and/or authorities) in one country. Similarly, many
residents of industrial nations view the labour standards of some developing countries as
illegitimate, and as a result, arguments about efficiency, consumer welfare, comparative
advantage, the history of industrial economies, or the essential contribution of children to
household income, often fall on deaf ears.
Proposals for moving the trade agenda forward while simultaneously addressing
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sumers are provided information about conditions in the exporting country. This could hap-
pen through a combination of independent agencies such as the International Labour Office
(ILO), private non-governmental organizations, a new international environmental review
organization, or some other organization(s). The advantages inherent in a labelling system
are that it educates consumers and lets them decide what to purchase, product by product,
thereby avoiding the blunt hammer of government-imposed sanctions.
Two Considerations 
T
his is not an exhaustive list of items on the new trade agenda, and additional topics are
currently under negotiation (e.g., product standards) or are potential topics for negoti-
ation (e.g., capital flows and migration). Two generally applicable considerations are the
potential for capture of the negotiations by protectionists and the distinction between har-
monization and mutual recognition of standards.
The potential for protectionist capture of the new trade agenda is a very real danger.
For example, recent odd alliances between labour and environmentalists, and between
extreme right-wing nationalists and left-wing progressives, usually center around a protec-
tionist consensus. Given that the industrial organization literature is full of examples of
government regulations that have been captured by the interests they were designed to reg-
ulate, there is no reason why trade agreements should be any different.
A second consideration is the distinction between harmonization of standards and
mutual recognition. In the former, standards are made more or less the same, while in the
latter, countries keep their own standards but agree to recognize those of their trading part-
ners, perhaps after some adjustment falling short of harmonization. It is often assumed that
closer integration requires harmonized standards, but the degree of harmonization depends
on the specific issue involved. For example, harmonization of collective bargaining rules
is probably less essential than harmonization of child labour rules, and some harmoniza-
tions are absolutely undesirable (e.g., overtime rules). Rules and preferences for standards
are a source of comparative advantage, and as long as they represent a non-coercive social
consensus, world welfare is greater when harmonization is avoided. Accordingly, many
economists argue that mutual recognition is usually superior to harmonization (Krugman,
1997). Given existing differences in national cultures and tastes, income levels, and geog-
raphy, there is no reason to believe that one set of standards will maximize every country’s
welfare. As long as standards reflect a social consensus, a competition of rules serves the
collective interest best and avoids the problem of harmonizing around a set of standards
that are less efficient and/or less equitable.
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T
he goal of most, but not all, of the new items on the trade negotiating agenda is to
increase consumer choice and producer efficiency through increased specialization in
production. Labour and environmental standards are different, however, in that they relate
to the public’s perception of fairness. In both industrial and industrializing economies, sup-
port for further integration is likely to fail if trade liberalization is perceived to increase
inequality. It does not matter that trade cannot do much, either positively or negatively, to
change the level of inequality. If it is believed that trade has increased inequality, then it is
hard to see how democratic societies will sustain the momentum towards deeper integra-
tion.
In the long run, the deeper-integration agenda seeks to create institutional changes that
are critical to the further deepening of international economic integration. Although each
theme is relatively limited in its application, they all serve the much broader purposes of
increasing transparency in rules and rulemaking, developing greater commitments to the
rule of law, and increasing the security of property rights. It is unlikely that these institu-
tional changes will completely overcome the greater transaction costs of trading abroad
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